As Russia has intensified its attacks on Ukraine’s
energy infrastructure in
recent months, the deployment of fiber-optic drones has
proven devastatingly
effective. The drones use hair-thin cables to maintain
direct connections with operators, making them highly
resistant to electronic jamming and essential to both sides
on the front line. The Kremlin’s use of these drones faced
a major setback in 2025, when a long-range Ukrainian drone
struck
the country’s only fiber optic plant, forcing it to
shut down. But Chinese manufacturers quickly
filled the gap, helping sustain Russia’s
operations.
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Fiber optic cables are one of many types
of dual-use specialized Chinese equipment found in Russian
drones. Beyond supplying
finished commercial drones that can later be weaponised,
Chinese manufacturers also provide many components in
Russian-built drones, including microchips,
engines,
lithium-ion
batteries, 5G
tech, mesh
modems used for communication, and other essential
parts.
With global military spending continuing
to rise, the US has further consolidated its dominance
of the major arms market, as Ukraine and European allies
increase purchases and Russia, its traditional rival,
diverts more of its own weapons to the war. According
to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), the US accounted for 42 percent of global
major-arms exports in 2021–2025, up from 36 percent in
2016–2020.
Together, the US and Western Europe accounted
for 74 percent of global major arms exports between 2021 and
2025. Beyond finished products, Western influence extends to
the technology used to manufacture high-performance military
electronics. Advanced
lithography equipment manufactured by the Netherlands-based
ASML, the world’s sole manufacturer of extreme
ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, enables chipmakers
to mass-produce the most sophisticated semiconductors, which
power cutting-edge military computing and artificial
intelligence systems. American allies such as Taiwan, South
Korea, and Japan also occupy
important positions in international electronics and
manufacturing supply chains.
This concentration of
arms production and critical technology among US and Western
companies gives them “significant economic and political
power, which enables them to drive the strategic interests
of states in exporting arms to conflict zones,” explains
arms control expert Hiruni Alwishewa. This provides them
with considerable influence over access to advanced weapons
and the ability to sustain military operations.
China,
while accounting for just
5.6 percent of global arms exports in 2021–2025, is
nonetheless reshaping modern industrial warfare in ways that
traditional measures of the arms trade struggle to fully
capture. The ease with which commercial products can be repurposed
for military use is transforming the arms business, even if
much of this is a byproduct of Beijing’s drive to become a
global manufacturing leader.
China’s growing role in
these supply chains challenges the dominant Western position
in the global arms trade. By supplying the components and
equipment other countries and armed groups need to wage war,
Beijing is gaining greater influence over their military
capabilities and campaigns. This, however, complicates
China’s stated neutrality in foreign
conflicts.
From Arms Buyer to Industrial
Lifeline
The war in Ukraine has transformed the
Russia-China weapons relationship. During the 1950s and
again in the 1990s and early 2000s, China’s armed forces
relied
heavily on Russian imports for combat aircraft, tanks,
submarines, and advanced technology, states the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. China’s growing
domestic capabilities have since turned it into an
international arms exporter and a competitor to Russia, even
in
markets Moscow once dominated.
Interestingly,
China remains an important
customer for Russia’s official arms industry,
according to SIPRI. But the flow of goods from China to
Russia in support of the war is harder to quantify since
much of it consists of civilian goods moving through
opaque trading networks and intermediaries. While a
substantial number of Western products are rerouted through
China, Chinese-made equipment and components play
an increasingly large role in sustaining Russia’s war
effort and, to
a lesser extent, Ukraine’s.
China’s dominant
and still-growing share of global vehicle production has
created a vast industrial base for Russia to draw on for
military use. Russian forces have purchased hundreds of
light armored personnel carriers from Shaanxi
Baoji Special Vehicle Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
as well as all-terrain vehicles produced by Shandong
Odes Industry Co., Ltd. Meanwhile, Chinese antennas
are used in electronic-warfare systems to disrupt
communications and navigation.
Chinese companies also
supply the industrial machinery and other inputs that
Russian factories need to manufacture weapons and
ammunition. These include milling
machines for cutting and shaping metal, lathes
for turning metal into precise components, and computer
numerical control (CNC) technology to automate
manufacturing.
The full scale of Russian dependence on
China is difficult to establish, but multiple analyses point
to Beijing’s significant role as a supplier. The Jamestown
Foundation estimated that in 2023, up
to 90 percent of Russia’s “metalworking machine
tools” came from China. Analysis by the Kyiv
School of Economics has found that China accounted for
roughly three-quarters of Russia’s reported imports of
Common High-Priority goods, including integrated circuits,
microelectronics, communication hardware, and optical
devices.
By 2024, “Chinese exports to Russia reached
$27 billion in machinery, $16 billion in electronics and $5
billion in telecom equipment—all well above pre-sanction
levels,” according
to Bob Savic, head of international trade and sanctions
consulting at the Global Policy Institute. Given how
extensively the Russian economy has been reoriented toward
its war effort, much of these imports likely supports
military production.
China’s Global Reach and
Unintended Consequences
China’s centrality in the
global arms market has created issues for US security
interests elsewhere. North Korea, for example, has expanded
arms cooperation with Russia while maintaining extensive
trade with China, offering Pyongyang the
means to sustain and upgrade its own weapons
production.
This dynamic can also be seen in Iran.
After US and Israeli attacks on Iranian missile
infrastructure throughout 2026, “Russia has coordinated
rebuilds using Chinese CNC machining centers and inertial
guidance gyroscopes,” according
to Savic, while Russia also serves as a conduit for
Chinese microchips used in drones and other military
equipment.
Since 2015, the Houthis have
meanwhile faced Saudi Arabia and UAE military
forces—both major recipients of American arms—as well as
US and Israeli strikes. A new Saudi-led
coalition involving Turkey and Pakistan to combat the
Houthis was announced in October after a major Houthi
offensive. Egypt later decided to extend
military support to Saudi Arabia.
Access to Chinese
components has helped the Houthis develop more capable
weapons and sustain their attacks. The Middle East Research
Observatory states
that “[b]etween 2021 and 2025, roughly 35 percent of
military items captured en route to the Houthis originated
in China, up from 5 percent between 2015 and
2018.”
In 2024, the US Treasury Department singled
out Chinese companies Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics,
Ltd.; Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports Co., Ltd.; and
Shenzhen Rion Technology Co., Ltd. for supplying dual-use
and military-grade components to Houthi networks involved in
drone and missile development. In October 2026, the Wall
Street Journal reported that Conflict
Armament Research had identified Chinese-sourced motor
parts, airframe sections, and solid-propellant materials in
an advanced Houthi ballistic missile.
These transfers
do not establish that Beijing intended to support Houthi
attacks. The armed groups’ missile and drone strikes on
Saudi Arabia, a
major Chinese trading partner, run counter to
Beijing’s economic interests and show how difficult it is
to control the end use of goods moving through global
markets. Meanwhile, “Saudi Arabia is signaling its
displeasure, but it is unlikely to risk a confrontation with
China, its largest trading partner and a major buyer of its
oil, even as those weapons threaten its security,” stated
Al-Monitor.
Chinese-made equipment has also appeared
in other conflicts where Beijing has little obvious interest
in escalation. In Sudan, Chinese drone
jammers,
surface-to-air missiles, and other equipment have been
observed, including in the hands of the Rapid Support
Forces, with reported supply
links to the United Arab Emirates. Chinese-made drones
have also reportedly
appeared in Libya despite a UN arms
embargo.
China’s Efforts to Refine and Cement its
Leverage
China’s growing ability to influence
conflicts and compete asymmetrically with US-led military
power will likely lead it to refine its approach. The
ongoing evolution of China’s export controls, including
another round in 2026, points to efforts to exert
greater control over how its exports are used, translating
into more direct geopolitical leverage rather than simply
accepting that its exports may be used in ways that do not
serve its interests.
Countries and armed groups that
rely on Chinese equipment and components will therefore
become more vulnerable to changes in Chinese export policy.
This will, however, help Beijing gain greater insight into
the military capabilities and supply needs of its direct and
indirect customers.
Despite Washington’s continual
dominance of official major arms exports, China’s
industrial reach extends into the US defense sector. A report
by defense analytics firm Govini found that Chinese-made
components feature in more than 1,900 military platforms,
and warned that the US is “fundamentally dependent on
China for essential components of its weapon systems.”
Additionally, China’s grip on critical mineral production
and processing has left 78 percent of the US arsenal
potentially exposed to Chinese mineral supply
dependencies.
As China’s leverage grows, the Western
alliance that has dominated global weapons production for
decades faces mounting internal divisions. Disputes over
continued support for Ukraine, lingering
unease over Trump’s pressure on Denmark over
Greenland, and trade tensions between Washington and its
European allies have strained the trust underpinning their
longstanding security partnership. The war in Ukraine has
exposed how China, while not displacing the US as the
leading exporter of traditional major arms, is increasingly
capable of challenging Western control over the industrial
foundations of modern warfare.
Author
Bio: John P. Ruehl is an Australian-American
journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs
correspondent for the Independent
Media Institute. He is a contributor to several foreign
affairs publications, and his book, Budget
Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy
Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December
2022.
Credit Line: This article
was produced by Economy
for All, a project of the Independent Media
Institute.
